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LEAD

ARTICLE

In Search of Savings
Caps on jury verdicts are not a solution to
health care crisis
by David Morrison

In the past two decades, twenty-eight states have al- rapidly, they blamed jury verdicts. Jury verdicts, they astered their tort laws to limit all or part of the damages a serted, were often excessive per se. Thus, according to the
jury may assess against a doctor accused of medical mal- advocates, high jury verdicts were the cause of rapidly
practice.' Further efforts to create new "caps" or to amend increasing malpractice insurance premiums.7 Moreover,
existing caps are pending in several states.2 Moreover, caps they asserted that caps on jury verdicts would result in
have been integral to several of the recently debated na- lower premiums and consequently in lower health care
tional health care reform proposals.3 Most recently, caps costs. When a perceived decline in health care was dishave been featured prominently in the Republican "Con- cussed, caps supporters again pointed to verdict-driven
' 4
tract with America.
insurance costs. They claimed that jury verdicts were reObservers generally acknowledge "waves" of caps on sponsible for large increases in insurance premiums, which
medical malpractice verdicts. Caps first occured in the drive health care providers out of practice and cause shortmid-1970s and featured laws that limited total compensa- ages of specific specialties, especially obstetricians.8 In
tion to a pre-determined amount.5 The second wave oc- the mid- 1980s, caps proponents introduced the idea of "decurred in the mid-1980s and differed from the first only fensive medicine." This concept was explicitly tied to
slightly. Specifically, these laws capped only noneconomic insurance rates. The Journal of the American Medical
damages, punitive damages or both. While the scope of Association reported that during the 1980s, every $1.00
the caps differed, the basic argument in favor of caps was increase in malpractice insurance costs resulted in a $3.50
largely the same. Caps proponents argued that malprac- increase in costs for additional testing to avoid malpractice insurance premiums had risen to intolerably high lev- tice.9 Thus, caps proponents linked caps to insurance rates
els and that insurers were losing money or were withdraw- and promised a better insurance environment only if jury
verdicts were artificially restricted.
ing from the region.6
Advocates for caps have argued that problems in the
insurance market had several, broader
consequences. While these advocates
tailored each argument to address the
Mr Morn
son is Research Associate of the Coalitionfor Conperceived needs of various health care
sumer Rig'hts. The Coalitionfor ConsumerRights is a Chicagocrises, they each shared a common mobased ceriter for public interest research and education. Mr
tor force: insurance rates. The link beMorrison
has a M.A. in American social and legal historyfrom
tween insurance rates and the need for
the University of Cincinnati.
caps takes many forms. In response to
claims that health care costs were rising
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Significantly, during these waves, opponents of caps
framed their arguments largely in terms of the relationship between caps and insurance. They countered that the
cost of medical liability comprised a minuscule fraction
of total health care spending so that artificial restrictions
on health care provider liability would have a negligible
effect on total expenditures. Many questioned even the
existence of an insurance "crisis," noting that malpractice
insurance remained immensely profitable. Moreover, they
noted, malpractice premiums had actually grown at a
slower rate than other health care provider costs. The direct and indirect effects ofjury verdicts on health care costs
and availability are negligible, they claimed, while the cost
of caps to victims is unconscionably high. Opponents also
argued that caps affect only the most seriously injured.
Rather than distributing the reduction in jury verdicts
among all malpractice victims, much of the effort focuses
on insurance costs and availability.'"
As the verdict limitations adopted during the first two
waves faced constitutional challenges, a sizeable body of
case law developed. Many challengers of jury verdicts
question who pays for and who benefits from caps. Several cases have been brought by injury victims whose verdicts were reduced by caps. In turn, these claims have
raised issues of equal protection," open courts, 2 due process, 1 3 and the right to a jury trial; 4 usually under state
law. 15 In facing one of the challenges, the survival of caps
most often hinged on the practical distribution of costs
and benefits.
Few courts ruled that caps of any sort were unconstitutional.' 6 Most acknowledged circumstances under which
legislatures could limit all or part of an injury victim's
recovery. But courts were careful about determining exactly what circumstances would allow such limitations.
Many courts adopted a balancing test, weighing the cost
of limits to victims against projected societal benefits. Only
in jurisdictions where courts were convinced that the promised benefits of lower health care costs and increased availability could be reasonably expected as a result of the caps
did the new laws pass constitutional challenges. 7 When
caps failed, they did so primarily because the insurance
"crisis" proved illusory. 8
Many of the arguments in favor of caps, including rural availability, obstetric availability, and defensive medicine, were explicitly tied to the idea of an "insurance crisis." Courts proved unwilling to accept that there was a
crisis at all, or, if such a crisis did exist, that caps on jury
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verdicts would help to solve the crisis. The argument that
caps bore a substantial relation to improving insurance
availability, central to the claims made by caps proponents,
became untenable as insurers' own analyses of the new
laws became public. For example, Florida's caps law, as
passed in 1986, require insurers to lower their rates unless
they can prove that the Act would be ineffective at lowering costs, rather than requiring the insurers to justify future rate hikes. 9
Aetna Insurance issued a report finding that the jury
verdict limits would have no impact on insurance rates.20
Perhaps most damning, the Insurance Services Office
("ISO"), an insurer-dominated clearinghouse, issued the
results of a survey of over 1,000 insurance executives in
2
24 states, including 15 that had recently imposed caps. '
The ISO found that an overwhelming majority believed
that caps would have no effect on rates. 22 Combined, these
reports reduced many arguments in favor of caps to non
sequiturs.
On the basis of these findings, many courts declared
the new caps laws to be unconstitutional. Courts in Alabama and New Hampshire struck caps under equal protection clauses. The Alabama supreme court noted:
"[a]lthough there is evidence of a connection between damages caps and the size of malpractice claims filed, the size
of claims filed is merely one among a host of factors bearing on the cost of malpractice insurance. ' '21 "By contrast,"
the court continued, "the burden imposed on the rights of
individuals to receive compensation for serious injuries is
direct and concrete. '24 The Texas supreme court found: "it
is unreasonable and arbitrary to limit [injury victims'] recovery in a speculative experiment to determine whether
or not liability rates will decrease. Texas Constitution article I section 13, guarantees meaningful access to the
25
courts whether or not liability insurance rates are high.
In Ohio, the court focused on the state constitution's due
process clause, holding: "it is irrational and arbitrary to
impose the cost of the intended benefit to the general public solely upon a class consisting of those most severely
injured by medical malpractice. '26 Both the Ohio and Texas
courts cited data confirming that caps had little or no effect on insurance rates.27
In the wake of these decisions, caps proponents have
tinkered with their arguments.2" The idea of a "crisis" remained, but the exact nature of the crisis became fuzzy.
Each of the "problems" that made the "crisis" had been
linked explicitly to insurance costs. After a series of de-
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feats in the courts, proponents began to disassociate the
"problems" from the cause. Caps proponents continue to
cite problems of rural availability, but generally do not
cite insurance rates as the cause. Obstetric availability remains a frequently-cited problem but, here too, insurance
rates are no longer blamed as the principle reason that
obstetricians leave the practice. Defensive medicine remains a mainstay of caps proponents' arguments but, where
the original studies expressed the cost of defensive medicine in terms of changes in insurance premiums, now proponents cite only the aggregate figure. Proponents have
repositioned themselves to
avoid the legal embarrass. *
1
. .
ment that greeted them dur- r-r11 *
ing the last wave of caps
laws.29
This tactical shift on the
part of caps proponents
could affect the next wave
of legal challenges. The new
spin on caps is that verdict
limits are needed to improve
the availability of rural and
obstetrical care and to decrease the practice of defensive medicine." The argument for the "need" for caps
has taken the place of the "insurance crisis" argument.3
While it is likely that caps laws will continue to face challenges on grounds of equal protection, due process, and
the right to ajury trial, the specific nature of the claim will
shift away from insurance costs and onto the general societal impact of caps. Where past legal challenges focused
on whether there was a substantial relation between jury
verdict caps and insurance rates, future cases may turn on
whether there is a substantial relation between caps and
availability.
Indeed, courts have suggested framing the question in
these terms.3 2 In Wright v CentralDuPageHospital, Justice Underwood of the Illinois supreme court dissented,
noting: "It is quite true that the $500,000 limitation upon
recovery bears most heavily upon the severely injured
person. A stronger case for the limitation would exist if it
permitted unrestricted recovery of actual expenses, for it
is conceivable, as the majority emphasizes, that with
today's inflated costs, total expenses of treatment and care
could exceed the allowable recovery. To be weighed against

that rather remote possibility, however, is the vital interest, if not the absolute necessity, of society in having adequate health care available at reasonable cost. To the
admittedly imprecise extent that the recovery limitation
here in question contributesto that goal,far more persons
are benefited than in any other area in which similar litigation occurs."33

While largely a case of old wine in new bottles, this
transition nonetheless necessitates a reformulation of the
debate. Of course, not all decisions striking caps were the
result of caps proponents' inability to prove a link between
caps and insurance
costs. a4 But many did,
and in these states,
caps opponents may
have to rework their
arguments. Moreover,
the bulk of academic
studies of the effects of
jury verdict caps generally reflect the focus
on insurance. These
studies focus on either
doctors' insurance
costs or the impact of
caps on claims severity and frequency:
how much insurers pay out, and how often.35
This article attempts to address this transition by examining empirical evidence of the effect of caps on jury
verdicts on the general population. Specifically, those who
are not injured by malpractice. The article will examine
aspects of health care costs and availability in Indiana,
which has a cap on the total compensation a jury may issue; and Illinois, which puts no restrictions on medical
malpractice jury verdicts. 6 Furthermore, this article focuses specifically on differences in aggregate and per capita
health care spending; aggregate and per capita physician
services spending; the availability of different specialties
of doctors; aggregate insurance levels and growth; and
profitability of malpractice liability insurance from 1980
to 1991.
Illinois and Indiana are ideally suited for such a comparison. These states share over 200 miles of border, but
their medical malpractice laws are worlds apart. During
the period from 1980 to 1991, Illinois put no limit on any
part of medical malpractice jury awards. Conversely, In-

lhis article attempts to

address this transition by
examining empirical
evidence of the effect of caps
on jury verdicts on the
general population.
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diana limited the total award both economically and noneconomically. 37 Illinois made those even partly responsible
for the specific instance of medical malpractice liable for Table 2: Physician Services Spending Per Capita
the total verdict; whereas Indiana limited each party's liIndiana
Illinois
Nation
ability to his estimated share of blame. No other set of
1980
165
187
199
neighboring states illustrates so dramatic a disparity in
1981
187
211
227
medical malpractice laws.38
1982
213
224
249
Likewise, Illinois' and Indiana's health care systems
1983
220
248
276
recently faced similar "crises." Legislators in both states
1984
247
275
307
adopted caps on total victim compensation in 1975, but,
1985
297
322
354
while the Indiana courts upheld caps, Illinois courts struck
1986
321
344
387
caps down.3 9 This article examines empirical data focus1987
364
379
429
ing on the years when Indiana had a cap and Illinois did
1988
399
413
478
not. It quantifies the consequences of these two decisions.
1989
433
435
516
Were the arguments in favor of caps true, Illinois' health
1990
485
476
564
care costs should have risen significantly in comparison
1991
515
496
598
with costs in Indiana. Greater availability of physician services including obstetrical care could also be expected. Table 2a: Rate of Growth 1980-1991
Moreover, while the number of hospital beds should seemTotal
212.12% 165.24%
200.50%
ingly increase, the costs of these beds should decrease. In
Average
addition, most Indiana residents should have seen some
Annual
10.9%
9.3%
10.5%
benefit from the restrictions paid for by victims.
Source: Health Care Finance Administration,
Office of the Actuary
Table 1: Health Care Spending Per Capita
Annual Rate of Change
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Indiana

Illinois

Nation

+12.48%
+7.40%
+6.18%
+8.44%
+6.67%
+8.17%
+8.63%
+8.27%
+10.13%
+10.24%

+8.69%
+6.48%
+6.34%
+7.62%
+4.68%
+6.34%
+7.26%
+6.71%
+8.77%
+7.66%

+11.7%
+8.7%
+7.7%
+8.8%
+7.3%
+8.4%
+9.1%
+8.4%
+9.8%
+9.1%

+37.21%

+41.7%

+7.34%

+9.0%

Total
+47.92%
Average
Annual +9.29%

Source: Health Care Finance Administration,
Office of the Actuary
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Health Care Spending: Greater Growth
with Caps than Without '°
Exploding health care spending is among the principle
reasons cited for current reform debate. Between 1980
and 1991 aggregate4' health care spending in the United
States grew nearly three-fold, from $226 billion to $676
billion, a 199% increase.42 Far outstripping growth in Gross
Domestic Product ("GDP"), health care consumed nearly
12% of the nation's economy. This number is up from
8.4% in 1980.4 3Efforts to slow this explosion have shaped
the current reform debate. Some claim that lawsuits and
unbridled jury verdicts have contributed to this explosion.
Thus, they contend, only by limiting recovery can govemient hope to slow health care spending.
Neither Indiana nor Illinois was immune to the forces
that pushed health care spending higher during the 1908s;
but these states experienced dramatically different growth
rates. Illinois' health care spending increased from $8.8
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billion in 1980 to $21.2 billion in 1991, an increase of
138.6%. During that time, even without caps on jury verdicts, Illinois grew significantly slower than the national
average. Relative to economic output, Illinois health care
spending grew moderately when compared to the nation
as a whole. In 1980, health care took 8.8% of Illinois' Gross
State Product ("GSP"), slightly more than the national average. But by 1986, health care was taking a smaller-than-

Table 3: Health Care Spending as a Percent of
Household Income
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Indiana
6.94%
7.47%
7.95%
7.67%
7.96%
8.04%
8.34%
8.60%
8.79%
9.30%
10.11%

Illinois
7.33%
7.71%
7.92%
7.70%
7.90%
7.87%
8.00%
8.07%
8.06%
8.36%
8.87%

Table 3a: Five Year Average 1987-1991
Total
9.07%
Average Annual
Increase
4.46%

Table 4: Doctors Per 10,000 Capita

8.30%
2.36%

Source: Based on figures from the Health Care
Finance Administration, Office of the Actuary.

average share of GSP at 9.5% compared to the national
average of 9.8%. By 1991, health care represented just
10% of GSP compared to 11.9% nationally. The absence
of caps obviously had no inflationary impact on health
care spending.
By contrast, Indiana's aggregate growth nearly equalled
the national pace. From $3.3 billion in 1980, Indiana's
health care spending grew 192.6% to $9.7 billion. Indiana's
economy was not as equipped to pay these increases. Its
economy grew 16% slower than the national economy as
a whole. Indiana's health care spending ballooned from
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8.1% in 1980 to 12.2% in 1991. In this respect, Indiana
surpassed Illinois by 1986 and the nation by 1990. Despite its severe limitation on medical malpractice victim
recovery, Indiana saw significantly greater growth in health
care spending.
Even in the area of physician services spending, which
would seem to be most sensitive to reductions in medical
malpractice liability, Indiana did not grow any slower than
Illinois or the nation. Across the United States, physician
services spending grew 235.6%, from $45 billion in 1980
to $151 billion in 1991. Indiana did slightly better, growing 220%, from $904 million to $2.9 billion. But here,
too, Illinois, without limits on victim compensation, experienced the slowest growth. Illinois' physician services
spending grew just 169%, from $2.1 billion to $5.7 billion.
Similar trends are evident when physician services
spending is examined in relation to population trends. Per
capita physician services spending grew 200% nationally,
from $199 to $598. Indiana grew 212%, from $165 to $515,
while Illinois grew just 165%, from $187 to $496. Despite
the fact that Indiana was 11% below Illinois' average in

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Indiana
9.5
9.9
10.4
10.9
11.1
11.3
11.2
11.5
11.7
12.0
12.3
12.6

Illinois
11.7
12.4
12.7
13.1
13.5
13.9
13.9
14.1
14.3
14.8
14.8
15.2

Table 4a: Five Year Average 1987-1991
Average

12.0

14.4

Source: Health Care Finance Administration,
Office of the Actuary
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tors per 10,000 capita grew from 9.5 to 12.6, or a 32.6%
increiise.
Ar other purported general benefit that proponents of
juryv 'erdict restrictions claim is increased availability of
Doctors per Capita: Comparable Growth medi -al services. Just over half a million Americans live
in cot unties without a physician in active patient care, and
in Both States
many more live in areas underserved by one or more mediIn 1980, the United States had 12.4 doctors per 10,000 cal st)ecialties.45 Caps supporters have argued that malcapita.' By 1991, the number of doctors per 10,000 capita practi ce lawsuits are one of the reasons that doctors choose
had grown 26.6%, to 15.7. In aggregate, the number of not tc practice in rural areas and that limits on injury vicdoctors grew by 115,744; a 41% increase. Illinois and In- tims' rights will help to correct this problem.
In diana's ability to provide health care to rural residiana both grew at faster rates. In Illinois, the number of
doctors grew from 11.7 per 10,000 capita to 15.2; a 30% dents is not markedly different from Illinois'. Both states
increase. Indiana grew slightly faster, but the difference is did a better job than did most other states. In 1986, both
not statistically significant. In Indiana, the number of doc- states had one county without an active physician in patient care. In Indiana, 0.10% of the population lived in the
county without a physician, while only 0.05% did
so in Illinois. By 1991, Illinois had two counties
without a physician, 0.15% of its population, while
Table 5: Hospital Room Costs at Selected Hospitals in
Indiana was unchanged. Both states were well beIllinois and Indiana
low the national average of 0.20% of population
46
in counties without an active physician.
Large Cities (population between 100,000 and 140,000)
Growth in obstetrical availability followed similar
patterns. Nationally, the number of obstetriSpringfield, Ill. (pop. 105,227)
4
and gynecologists grew 30.4% to 34,000. 1
cians
Delivery
Emergency
Basic
Illinois' figures grew from 11.7 per 100,000 capita
Name
Room
Room
Ro om
13.7, a 17.5% increase. In aggregate, Illinois
to
na
$73
$334
Doctor's Hospital
grew
from 1,300 to 1,600. Indiana grew 26.9%,
nr
nr
nr
St. John's Hospital
from
380
to 480 or 7.0 per 100,000 capita to 8.6, a
nr
nr
nr
Memorial Medical
48
22.9% increase.
1980, it surpassed Illinois by 1990 and stood 3.8% above
Illinois' average in 1991. As table 2 indicates, both states
were below the national average.

Evansville, Ind. (pop. 126,272)
Basic
Room
Name
Deaconess Hosp.
$360
$360
St. Mary's
Welborn Memorial
$354
Illinois Average:
Indiana Average:

$334
$358

Emergency
Room

$73
$61

Del
Roi
$650
$360
$390
nr
$467

Source: Phone survey conducted in March and April,
1994. The designation "na" means that the hospital does
not provide that service. The designation "nr" means
that the hospital did not respond to the survey. Interview
by Kim Simmons and Trelinda Pitchford.
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Hospital Costs: No Appreciable
Difference
The Prospective Payment Assessment Commission ("ProPAC") recently tabulated average medicare hospital inpatient cost per discharge in 1991
for all fifty states. According to this report, the average charge in Illinois was $4,625 while Indiana
was slightly higher at $4,675. Medicare costs may
not be typical of all health care costs to consumers; however, the ProPAC report suggests that
Indiana's health care costs are not substantially
lower than Illinois'.
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Table 6: Hospital Room Costs at Selected Hospitals in
Illinois and Indiana
Medium Cities (population between 50,000 and 60,000)
Basic
Room
Name/City
Skokie, Ill. (pop.59,432)
Rush North Shore
$49
Bloomington, Ill. (pop.51,972)
St. Joseph's
nr
Bromenn Lifecare
$329
Anderson, Ind. (pop. 57,483)
Community Hospital $311
St. John's
$330
Bloomington, Ind. (pop. 60,633)
Bloomington Hosp.
$470
Terre Haute, Ind. (pop. 57,483)
Terre Haute Hosp.
$325
Union Hosp.
$355

Emergency
Room

Delivery
Room

$100

(range)

nr
$59

nr
$472

$50
(range)

$460
$330

$81

$470

$66
(range)

$340
$400

Illinois Average:
Indiana Average:

$79
$66

$472
$400

$412
$358

field did. The results suggest that residents of large
cities pay slightly more for a basic room in Indiana
and slightly less for an emergency room treatment.
Survey results do not allow comparison of costs for
a delivery room.
For medium cities with a population between
50,000 and 60,000, one hospital in Skokie, Ill., two
in Bloomington, Ill., one in Bloomington, Ind., two
in Anderson, Ind., and two in Terre Haute, Ind., were
surveyed. One hospital in Bloomington, Ill. did not
respond. We found that costs for a basic room, for
an emergency room, and for a delivery room were
all slightly higher in Illinois. The differences were
all within the difference in per capita income, however, and so may not represent a difference in real
cost.

Source: Phone survey conducted in March and April, 1994.
The designation "na" means that the hospital does not
provide that service. The designation "nr" means that the
hospital did not respond to the survey. The designation
"(range)" means that the hospital gave several changes for
the facility, depending on various factors. Interview by Kim
Simmons and Trelinda Pitchford.

For small towns with a population between
10,000 and 14,000, the survey included one hospital in each of the following: Effingham, Canton,
Pontiac and Morris in Illinois; Madison, Bedford,
Peru, Jasper and Warsaw in Indiana. All hospitals
responded to the survey. We found that costs for a
basic room, for an emergency room, and for a delivery room were all slightly lower in Illinois.
Health care costs and availability are just two
factors present in the debate over jury verdict restrictions. Other factors include the cost of insurance to doctors and the cost to insurers of paying
claims. The remainder of this section will examine
the experiences of health care providers and insurers under the two legal regimes.

Insurers Benefit Through Higher
Profits
To determine what people actually pay for health care,
twenty hospitals in both states were surveyed to determine
the charges for basic rooms, emergency rooms and delivery rooms. Costs for rooms in Illinois and Indiana are
similar. Even though Illinois' citizens per capita personal
income is 20% higher than Indiana's, and even though Illinois lacks the medical malpractice restrictions that Indiana has, Illinois resident pay about the same for health care.
Representing cities with a population between 100,000
and 140,000, three hospitals each in Springfield, Ill. and
Evansville, Ind. were surveyed. Although all of the Evansville hospitals responded to our survey; only one in Spring-
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Insurers have realized significant gains from Indiana's
medical malpractice restrictions. While premiums are significantly lower, payments to victims are lower still, so
that Indiana profit margins represent a larger share of the
insurance dollar. In Illinois, money set aside to pay victims, termed "adjusted losses" by insurers, declined at an
average annual rate of 10% between 1987 and 1991. In
Indiana adjusted losses fell at an average annual rate of
54.89%. Indiana's rate of decline was nearly five times
the rate in Illinois.
On a per patient basis, the decline in adjusted loss is
equally significant, and once again, Indiana saw greater

Lead Articles a 147

Table 7: Hospital Room Costs at Selected Hospitals in
Illinois and Indiana
Small Towns (population between 10,000 and 14,000)
Basic
Name/City
Room
Canton, Ill. (pop. 13,922)
Graham Hosp.
$390
Effingham, Ill. (pop. 11,851)
St. Anthony's
$290
Morris, Ill. (pop.10,270)
Morris Hosp.
$410
Pontiac,Ill. (pop. 11,428)
St. James'
$280
Bedford, Ind. (pop.13,817)
Bedford Med. Cntr.
$375
Jasper,Ind. (pop. 10,030)
Memorial Hosp.
$290
Madison, Ind. (pop. 12,006)
The King's Daughter's $358
Peru, Ind. (pop. 12,843)
Dukes Memorial
$334
Warsaw, Ind. (pop. 10,968)
Kosciusko Community $370
Illinois Average:
Indiana Average:

$343
$345

Emergency
Room

Delivery
Room
$390
$445

twice the rate of Illinois'

.49

$675
$300
$841

Table 8: Medical MalpracticeInsurance
Adjusted Losses (Aggregate)
Annual Rate of Change

$290
(range)

$609
$334
$320

$58
$68

$453
$479

Source: Phone survey conducted in March and April,
1994. The designation "nr" means that the hospital did not
respond to the survey. The designation "(range)" means that
the hospital gave several changes for the facility, depending
on various factors. Interview by Kim Simmons and Trelinda
Pitchford.

declines than did Illinois. Illinois' adjusted loss per patient fell 21.2% between 1987 and 1991. In Indiana, adjusted losses per patient fell 61.3% overall. Indiana's decline occurred at nearly three times the rate of Illinois'
decline.
In both states, over the period of 1985-1992, medical
malpractice was the single most profitable line of prop-
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erty/casualty insurance when measured as a percent
of premium. But insurers in Indiana took a larger
share of premium in profit. In Illinois, medical malpractice insurance earned an aggregate profit of just
over twice the profits earned in all property/casualty insurance (22.6% of premium in medical malpractice versus 11.0% in all lines). Indiana's experience was even higher. Indiana's medical malpractice insurers earned aggregate profits of 48.5% of
premium, compared to 3.6% in all lines; medical
malpractice insurance turned a profit of more than
13 times the average line of property/casualty insurance. Most significantly, Indiana's profit was

1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Indiana
+63.37%
-73.34%
+0.64%
+59.21%
-2.30%
-42.42%
+12.13%
-303.92%
+64.09%
-4.30%

Illinois
+30.89%
-60.73%
+36.10%
+42.12%
-31.90%
-74.14%
+42.60%
-63.63%
+20.96%
+21.71%

Table lOa: Five Year Average 1987-1991
Total
Average
Annual

-24.79%

+72.05%

-54.88%

-10.50%

Source: Adjusted losses are the insurers
estimate of what it will cost to pay claims to
victims of medical malpractice. These
figures also include dividend payments to
policyholders. Based on figures from Best's
Review.
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Table 9: Medical MalpracticeInsurance
Adjusted Losses PerPatient
Annual Rate of Change
1982
1983

+56.80%
-69.84%
+983
-69.84%

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

+6.54%
+58.30%
-5.41%
-4.83%
-0.9%
-317.44%

1990
1991

+59.87%
-5.87%

+21.73%
+2 3%
-39.62%
+35.33%
+39.98%
-41.30%
8.73%
+8.2%
-67.27%
+15.97%
+19.02%

Table 11a: Five Year Average 1987-1991
Totae
Average
Annual

4in
-61.87%

-14.94%

Source: We calculated adjusted losses using
figures from Best's Review. We applied these
figures to the combined total of hospital admissions and outpatients. Patient figures are from
Health Care Finance Administration, Office of the
Actuary.

Discussion
Tremendous growth in health care expenditures has
strained state budgets and led policymakers to search for
sensible ways to contain costs. Many legislators have been
tempted by claims that artificial restrictions on health care
provider liability could help to contain total health care
spending. This argument assumes that health care cost and
availability are fairly elastic relative to liability costs; that
a diminution in liability will result in a similar decline in
health care spending and an increase in health care availability.
Experience in Indiana fails to bear out this theory.
Indiana's medical malpractice laws have produced no sav-
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ings for Indiana health care consumers. While Indiana
medical malpractice insurers are far more profitable than
their Illinois counterparts, the savings from restrictive
medical malpractice laws have not trickled down to
Indiana's health care consumers. Despite the fact that Indiana insurers pay smaller benefits to medical malpractice
victims, Indiana residents pay more for doctors' services
than Illinois residents. Indiana's health care spending per
capita grew at a rate 20% faster than Illinois'. Furthermore, Indiana's spending on physician services per capita
grew at a rate 17% faster than Illinois', and Indiana residents now spend more for doctors' services, per capita,
than Illinois residents. In sum, as a percentage of household income, health care costs grew almost twice as fast
in Indiana as in Illinois.
Instead, Indiana's experience suggests that most of the
benefits of caps on jury verdicts accrue not to consumers
but principally to insurers within the health care system.
Insurance companies earned dramatically higher profits
Indiana than in Illinois. In both states, medical malpractice was the single most profitable line of property/
casualty insurance, yet Indiana was more than twice as

Table 10: Medical MalpracticeInsurance
InsurerProfits
As a Percent of Premium

1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Total
Average
Annual

Indiana
18.7
26.6
42.8
42.8
84.1
43.3
52.6
64.7

Illinois
-20.9
23.9
52.2
31.2
34.8
29.1
6.2
11.2

48.5

22.6

46.9

21.0

Source: National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, Report on Profitability
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profitable. Insurance companies retained the savings generated by jury verdict restrictions allowing no identifiable
benefits to trickle through to consumers.

Conclusion
Laws which restrict jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases have not lowered health care spending or increased health care availability. Indiana's malpractice legislation has not produced any cost savings for Indiana's
health care consumers, nor has it demonstrably increased
the number of doctors in the state. In fact, Indiana's laws
have penalized those most injured by medical malpractice
with no tangible benefit to Indiana residents.
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More broadly, the practical experience in states that have
imposed limits on jury verdicts does not support the contention that consumers receive a quid pro quo in exchange
for curtailed legal remedies. Injury victims pay substantial amounts under caps, but the benefits provided in exchange are slight indeed. The benefits claimed by caps
supporters including lower growth in health care costs,
increased availability of specialties of care, and increased
availability in underserved areas, have not borne out. Instead, Indiana residents have seen substantially faster
growth in health care costs than have Illinois residents and
continue to have substantially fewer doctors per capita,
even in obstetrics.
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